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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
: Case No. 90- 0241 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: (Priority No. 16) 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through 
counsel John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal 
Clinic pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
submits the following BRIEF in support of his appeal: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff appeals an order of sanctions awarding 
attorney fees for an alleged violation of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff unilaterally dismissed this case under Rule 
41 (a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on Septem-
I 
ber 11, 1989. No objection has ever been raised to that 
dismissal. Thereafter, on January 10, 1990 defendants moved 
for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
1 
Procedure. Plaintiff responded with a Memorandum and his 
first affidavit. 
On February 2, 1990 the trial court granted defendants1 
request for sanctions and directed them to file an 
itemization of fees incurred and authorized plaintiff to 
file an objection. 
Defendants itemized their fees to the Court by affida-
vit on February 16, 1990 and the plaintiff objected on 
February 26, 1990. As part of that objection plaintiff 
filed a second affidavit and the affidavits of eight (8) 
practicing Salt Lake City attorneys (hereinafter "attorney 
affidavits11). The trial court overruled plaintifffs ob-
jection, and upon defendants1 motion struck the bulk of 
plaintiff's second affidavit and his objection and struck 
all the attorney affidavits. 
On March 22, 1990 plaintiff moved for a new trial and 
in support thereof re-submitted his objection, his second 
affidavit and the attorney affidavits. That objection and 
all affidavits were before the Court when it considered 
plaintiff's motion for new trial. That motion for a new 
trial was denied. 
The Court entered an order and judgment assessing 
attorney fees against the plaintiff in the sum of $4,381.00 
on April 23, 1990. A timely appeal was filed on May 3, 
1990. 
2 
Plaintifffs motion for a summary reversal on appeal was 
denied by this Court on June 19, 1990, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As of July 19, 1990, the Third District Court Deputy 
Clerk in charge of appeals had not indexed or paginated the 
official record from the proceedings below. Consequently, 
reference to particular pages of the trial record is impos-
sible. For this Court's convenience, plaintiff has attached 
as exhibits the documents most heavily relied upon in 
plaintifff s arguments. 
1. Plaintiff filed the complaint herein against the 
Utah State Bar and Assistant Bar Counsel, Toni Marie Sutliff 
on August 2, 1989 (Exhibit "A"), 
2. After defendants filed a motion to dismiss, plain-
tiff on September 11, 1989, voluntarily dismissed this 
action pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. The action below was dismissed as moot because 
defendants provided plaintiff the relief he sought -- the 
defendants identified the members of the Screening Panel to 
which plaintiff's pending disciplinary matter was assigned 
and revealed the procedure for assignment of a disciplinary 
complaint to a Screening Panel. 
4. No objection has been made to that dismissal. 
3 
5. The Court below considered the case to be dis-
missed. Judge Hanson acknowledged (Memorandum Decision, 
Exhibit "L", February 12, 1990, p. 4) that the plaintiff 
voluntarily and unilaterally dismissed this suit. 
6. On January 10, 1990, defendants filed a motion 
seeking, among other things, sanctions under Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter "Rule llff) 
alleging, among other things, that the Third Judicial 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's dismissed claims. 
7. The plaintiff responded by filing his first affida-
vit (Exhibit lfBfI) and a memorandum in opposition. 
8. The trial court herein, the Hon. Tim Hanson, judge 
presiding, ruled that plaintiff violated Rule 11 by filing 
the complaint in the Third District Court instead of in the 
Utah Supreme Court (Order of February 12, 1990 attached as 
Exhibit "L"). The trial court determined that because 
plaintiff's action questioned the Bar's "governance of the 
practice of law" and related to disciplinary procedures of 
the Bar that a district court had no subject matter juris-
diction. 
9. The Court below directed defendants to itemize 
their attorney fees and recited that plaintiff could file a 
further objection when the itemization was presented. 
10. On February 16, 1990, defendants filed their 
itemization of attorney fees. On February 26, 1990, 
4 
plaintiff filed his objection along with a second affidavit 
(Exhibit "C") and the attorney affidavits regarding the 
legal research of those attorneys as to the status of the 
law vis-a-vis jurisdiction of the District Court in a case 
such as this. (Affidavits of James Ausenbaugh, John B. 
Maycock, Robert Breeze, G. Stephen Sullivan, Kevin Anderson, 
Ross Anderson, Gary Ferguson, and Mark Gustavson (Exhibits 
"D" - "K")). Plaintiff also requested that the trial Court 
take judicial notice of certain cases filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
11. The attorney affidavits establish that the law is 
not clear that a District Court lacks subject matter juris-
diction over cases involving the Utah State Bar, its pol-
icies, agents and employees (see Exhibit "D" - "K"). 
12. The two (2) uncontroverted affidavits of plaintiff 
detail underlying facts (Exhibit ,fB") and the research 
(Exhibit ffCfl) completed prior to filing the complaint as to 
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving the Utah 
1. Plaintiff calls this Court's attention to a rule making 
petition he filed in this Court (No. 89-0423, filed Septem-
ber 27, 1989) in which he asked this Court by rule making to 
determine and/or clarify the correct court in which to file 
adversary actions against the Bar and Bar Counsel question-
ing disciplinary actions or procedures. That petition 
resulted from the Bar's claims of immunity from suit in such 
actions, as well as its claim that the Supreme Court has 
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear such adversary 
matters. 
5 
State Bar, its policies, agents and its governance of the 
practice of law. 
13. The cases which plaintiff asked the Court to 
judicially note establish that two (2) judges of the Third 
Judicial District Court previously exercised subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar, its employees, and its 
governance of the practice of law (discussed infra, Point I, 
§§ A, B). 
14. The Court below struck the bulk of the plaintiff's 
objection, his second affidavit and the attorney affidavits 
and thus did not consider them as part of the plaintiff's 
objection. Order of March 14, 1990, Exhibit "M". 
15. A final order and a judgment were entered on April 
23, 1990 awarding attorney fees of $4,381.00 under Rule 11 
to the defendants (Exhibits "N" & "0"). 
16. Plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 22, 1990 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Rule 59 and Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, 767 P.2d 125, 99 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
25 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). In support of that motion plaintiff 
re-submitted his objection, his second affidavit and the 
attorney affidavits. That objection and all ten (10) 
affidavits were before the Court when it considered plain-
tiff's motion for new trial. 
17. The trial court: declined to grant a new trial to 
reconsider its ruling (Order of May 2, 1990, attached as 
6 
Exhibit "P"). The trial court also declined to make find-
ings to support its ruling (id,). 
18. On May 3, 1990, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 
herein (Exhibit "Q"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 in filing an 
action challenging conduct and policies of the Utah State 
Bar and its Assistant Bar Counsel in the Third Judicial 
District Court instead of in this Court. The law is unclear 
that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over this action. Plaintiff made a reasonable pre-filing 
investigation as to the law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY IMPOSING RULE 11 
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
A. Plaintiff's Conduct Did Not Warrant Rule 11 
Sanctions. 
Sanctions under Rule 11 are inappropriate where there 
are differing interpretations of the law or where contrary 
controlling authority is not obvious. 0'Connell v. Champion 
Int'1 Corp., 812 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1987); Kamen v. Amer. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, (2nd Cir. 1986); Federal 
7 
Deposit Ins, Co, v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 
1986), The party seeking Rule 11 sanctions is burdened with 
showing that the filing party pursued the litigation in bad 
faith or brought a frivolous, unreasonable or groundless 
action. See U,S, Industries, Inc, v. Touche Ross & Co,, 854 
F.2d 1223, 1241 (10th Cir. 1988). A simple showing that the 
filing party did not prevail is not enough to justify Rule 
11 sanctions. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit declared: 
The standard developed by courts for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11 is stringent because such 
sanctions 1) are "in derogation of the general 
American policy of encouraging resort to the 
courts for peaceful resolution of disputes," 
Eastway Construction Corp, v. City of New York, 
637 F,Supp, 558, 564 (E.D.NY. 1986), modifiecTand 
remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); I) 
tend to "spawn satellite litigation counterproduc-
tive to efficient disposition of cases," Gaiardo 
[v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 
1987)]; and 3) "increase tensions among the 
litigating bar and between the bench and the bar." 
Eastway Construction Corp., 637 F.Supp. at 564. 
Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 
191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988). 
In considering sanctions under Rule 11, courts are to 
resolve ambiguities in favor of the filing party, and if 
there are differing opinions concerning the merits, 
sanctions should not be applied. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 
F.2d 1265, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. 
Liab, Ins, Co,, 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986); Eavenson, 
Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir. 
8 
1985); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 
177 (7th Cir. 1985)• ff[W]hen issues are close, the invoca-
tion of Rule 11 borders on the abusive: We caution 
litigants that Rule 11 is not to be used routinely when the 
parties disagree about the correct resolution of a matter in 
litigation. Rule 11 is intended for only exceptional 
circumstances." Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (quotes and cites omitted). See Doering, 857 
F.2d at 194 (the primary purpose of Rule 11 is "deterrence 
of abuses of the legal system.") 
Plaintiff's filing his action in the District Court was 
neither so abusive of the legal system, nor exceptionally 
reprehensible to warrant Rule 11 sanctions. There is no 
clear law that holds that a Utah District Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over matters involving the Utah 
State Bar, its agents and its governance of the practice of 
law in Utah (see § II, infra (constitutional and statutory 
research compels an opposite conclusion)). In fact, two (2) 
judges of the Third Judicial District Court have found that 
the district court has jurisdiction over the policies and 
actions of the Utah State Bar and its regulation of the 
practice of law. See R. Owen Neerin^s v. Utah State Bar, 
et al, Case No. 88-3807 (Judge Sawaya); Barnard v. Utah 
State Bar and Hutchinson, Case No. 88-0578, (Judge H. 
Wilkinson). Further, plaintiff in preparing this case could 
find no law that prohibited the filing in district court 
9 
(Exhibits "B" & "C") . Finally, eight (8) other Salt Lake 
City attorneys, researched the issue and concluded that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case 
(Exhibits ,,D,,-,fK,f) . 
Any law requiring the original filing of this action in 
the Supreme Court is not so obvious and clear as to warrant 
Rule 11 sanctions• 
B. Plaintiff Conducted Extensive Pre-Filing Research. 
Rule 11 requires a reasonable inquiry into the status 
of the law upon which an action is based. It is certainly 
not necessary, however, for plaintiff to cite authority for 
his claims in his Verified Complaint. See e.g., Ault v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied 109 S.Ct. 1532. 
Here, plaintiff made a reasonable pre-filing inves-
tigation as to the the law regarding the jurisdiction of the 
District Court. (Plaintifffs Second Affidavit (Exhibit 
nC")). That uncontroverted affidavit establishes more than 
a reasonable pre-filing investigation. Plaintiff relied, in 
part, upon prior rulings of judges of the Salt Lake County 
Third Judicial District Court, in which they exercised 
jurisdiction over the Bar, its agents and policies. 
Prior to this case, plaintiff personally filed two (2) 
pro se actions in District Court regarding the governance of 
the practice of law, regulation of attorneys and actions of 
10 
the Utah State Bar, Barnard v, Utah State Bar and 
Hutchinson, Case No. 88-0578, (Judge H. Wilkinson), and, 
Barnard v. Hutchinson and Utah State Bar, Case No. 88-0801 
(Judge P. Brian). Both of these cases involve the "gover-
nance of the practice of law,11 the operations of the Utah 
State Bar and the regulation of attorneys. In both actions, 
employees of the Bar are defendants and the Bar's governance 
of the practice of law was challenged. 
In Third District Court Case No. 88-0801, Judge P. 
Brian has not ruled upon the defendantsf affirmative defense 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Ut. Const. VIII, 
§ 4. That case is still pending but action has been stayed 
awaiting a decision by this Court in Barnard v. Utah State 
Bar, Case No. 88-0578 (Supreme Court Case No. 88-0201). 
I 
In Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Third District Court Case 
No. 88-0578, (now on appeal to this Court as Case No. 88-
0201, argued to this Court on December 5, 1989) Judge H. 
Wilkinson denied the defendantsf affirmative defense to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Ut. Const. Art. VIII, 
§ 4 (the same basis as defendants' motion herein). In that 
case, Judge Wilkinson found the District Court to have 
jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar and determined that Ut. 
Const. Art. VIII, § 4 did not preclude such an action in 
District Court. That case dealt with the operations of the 
Utah State Bar and whether it must publically reveal the 
salaries of its employees. 
11 
Plaintiff herein represented R. Neerings in the case of 
R. Owen Neerings v. Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807 
(Judge Sawaya, filed June, 1988) in the Third District 
Court. That case dealt with the admission process of the 
Utah State Bar, and the bar exam and the privacy of bar exam 
2 
results. Judge J. Sawaya found the District Court had 
jurisdiction, and in early 1989, resolved the case on its 
merits granting summary judgment to the Bar defendants. 
(That case is now before this Court on appeal as Case No. 
89-0088.) 
The plaintiff, as part of his pre-filing legal re-
search, reasonably relied upon the rulings of Judge 
Wilkinson and Judge Sawaya. 
C. The Trial Court's Rule 11 Sanction Order Is Clearly 
Erroneous Because It Is Completely Unsupported By The" 
Record. 
Levying sanctions is a two-step process. Specifically 
regarding Rule 11 sanctions, first the trial court should 
determine that a pleading violates Rule 11. Such a finding 
"typically involves subsidiary findings, such as the current 
state of the law or the parties1 and attorneys1 behavior and 
motives within the context of the entire litigation, as well 
2. Admissions of attorneys is specifically mentioned in 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4 as within the exclusive rule 
making powers of this Court. 
12 
as a conclusion on the ultimate question whether the plead-
ing violated Rule 11." Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 672 
(10th Cir. 1988). Second, the trial court must fashion the 
appropriate remedy. Id. Here, not only did the trial court 
not set forth any facts to support its finding of a Rule 11 
violation, but it could not because there are simply no such 
facts. 
The trial court declined to make any findings as to 
plaintiff's pre-filing investigation (Order of April 23, 
1990, Exhibit "P"). Because there are no facts to support a 
finding of inadequate pre-filing investigation, the trial 
court's determination must be reversed by this Court as 
3 
clearly erroneous. The only facts in the record prove that 
plaintiff conducted a thorough pre-filing investigation and 
that the law is unclear. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS WAS ERRONEOUS. 
No clear and unequivocal law holds that a district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this action. 
I 
3. Plaintiff/appellantfs "marshalling of the facts" to 
show a lack of evidence to support the factual determination 
is a reference to the two (2) uncontroverted detailed 
affidavits of plaintiff (Exhibits "B" and "C"). 
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Nonetheless, the position of the Bar is that the district 
court does not have jurisdiction over any claim against the 
Bar arising out of the Bar's activities as an arm of the 
Supreme Court carrying out its delegated responsibilities. 
The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are 
set forth in their entirety in Exhibits "R" (Ut. Const. Art. 
VIII, §§ 3-5), f,S" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amend-
ed)), and "T" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended)). 
Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4, the basis of defendants1 
motion to dismiss and the court imposed sanctions herein, 
deals only with rule making and has not application to 
jurisdiction of this Court or the District Court. It 
provides in pertinent part: 
The supreme court by rule shall govern 
the practice of law, including admission 
to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to 
practice. 
That constitutional provision is not limited to disciplinary 
matters but deals with the governance of the practice of law 
in all aspects and the operations of the Utah State Bar 
4 
whose sole function is to govern the practice of law. 
4. District courts routinely, at the request of the Bar, 
exercise jurisdiction to enjoin the (unauthorized) practice 
of law. Utah State Bar vs. Hamilton, Third Judicial 
District Court, Civil No. 88-1380. The Bar's mandate to do 
so is based upon Ut. Const., Art. VIII, § 4. Given the 
Bar's position and the trial court's ruling in this case, 
actions to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law are 
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court. 
14 
The Legislature has not construed Article VIII, § 4 to 
preclude original jurisdiction over lawyer discipline cases 
in courts other than the Supreme Court. See e.g., Ut. Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended). Nor have the 
district courts abdicated all jurisdiction over the numerous 
tasks related to the governance of law. See Barnard v. 
Hutchinson, Case, No. 88-0578, and in R. Owen Neerings v. 
Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807, discussed above. 
The framers of Article VIII, § 4 clearly intended the 
section to grant rule making authority -- not original 
jurisdiction -- to the Supreme Court to govern the practice 
of law. Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, 
Jan. 1984 [hereinafter "1984 Report11] ; Report of the Consti-
tutional Revision Commission, Jan. 1982 [hereinafter "1982 
Report11]. In both the 1984 Report and the 1982 Report, the 
proposed language regarding the Supreme Court's rulemaking 
authority over the practice of law was identical to the 
language adopted by the Legislature in 1984. 
In the explanation of its proposed § 4, the Commission 
stated, "The rulemaking authority also includes a specific 
responsibility to govern the practice of law, including the 
admission to practice and the discipline of attorneys.11 
1984 Report, at 27. In 1982, the Commission explained, 
"[Art. VIII, § 4] specifically provides for rulemaking by 
the Supreme Court including the right to authorize judges 
pro tempore, and to govern the practice of law and the 
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conduct and discipline of attorneys.11 1982 Report, at 21. 
Neither explanation of Article VIII, § 4 by the drafters 
refers to original jurisdiction over litigation involving 
the Utah State Bar. 
Certainly, "the regulation of the practice of law" in 
Utah is within the exclusive rule-making power of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Utah Const., Art. VIII, § 4. Almost identi-
cal language is found in Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as 
amended). Those provisions are in the nature of granting 
"legislative" and "administrative" power to the Utah Supreme 
Court for the purpose of enacting "laws" or rules to govern 
the practice of law. Article VIII, § 4 does not dictate 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court vis-a-vis the 
District Courts of Utah. The provision evinces the "sepa-
ration of powers" doctrine and does not establish "jurisdic-
tion" of the Court. Article VIII, § 4 is rule making 
5. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as amended) provides 
that "The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law." 
6. In addition to the exclusive power regarding rules to 
govern the practice of law (Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4), the 
Utah Supreme Court is to "adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state . . . " Id. 
Thus, following the trial court ruling and the Bar's logic, 
a district court could not determine that a rule of proce-
dure adopted by the Supreme Court was unconstitutional. 
Likewise, a trial court could not entertain, much less rule 
upon, a question as to the validity of a rule of evidence. 
Such challenges would have to be raised for the first time 
on appeal and only in this Court (not the Court of Appeals). 
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authority and does not suggest that the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in adversary proceedings to hear legal chal-
lenges to disciplinary actions. No Utah cases support such 
a suggestion. \ 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is generally 
defined by Article VIII, § 3 (Exhibit ,fR,f) -- the only 
constitutional provision that addresses the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction. The framers of Article VIII, § 3 did not 
envision ordinary civil litigation originating in the 
Supreme Court. In the 1984 Report, which proposed the exact 
language eventually adopted by the Legislature, the framers 
declare: 
The proposed article outlines the jurisdiction of 
the supreme court. The revision gives the court 
the original jurisdiction to issue all extraordi-
nary writs and to answer questions of state law in 
federal courts. The supreme court is vested with 
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters. 
Id., at 26. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is more specif-
ically defined by Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended) 
(Exhibit ffSlf). Neither provision vests any jurisdiction 
(original, exclusive or otherwise) in the Supreme Court over 
the mis-conduct of agents of the Utah State Bar, challenges 
to unconstitutional policies or practices of the Bar, etc. 
Likewise, Art. VIII, § 5 (Exhibit "R"), and Ut. Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) define the jurisdiction of 
the District Courts. Neither provision denies jurisdiction 
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to that court of general jurisdiction over matters regarding 
the Bar, its policies and agents. As noted by the framers 
of Article VIII, § 5, the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion must be very carefully limited because matters orig-
inating there have no available avenue of appeal. 1984 
Report, at 29. Once again, if the Bar's interpretation of 
Article VIII, § 4 is affirmed, then not only will all 
litigation involving the Bar, along with all state law based 
challenges to procedural and evidentiary rules (supra, note 
7) originate in the Supreme Court, but also none of the 
litigants therein will enjoy a right of appeal. 
Significantly, the Legislature acting pursuant to 
Article VIII, has vested original jurisdiction over cases 
challenging lawyer discipline in the District Courts. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c), § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) 
(Exhibits "S" and ffTM respectively). The Legislature 
granted jurisdiction to the Supreme Court only to hear 
appeals regarding lawyer discipline. Ut. Code § 78-2-2 
(3)(c) (1953 as amended) (Exhibits "S") . The Legislature's 
constitutional interpretation directly conflicts with the 
Bar's and the trial court's interpretation of Art. VIII, 
§ 4. 
The law in Utah is not clear that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction in this matter. 
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An Anomaly 
The position of the Utah State Bar and the ruling of 
the trial court as to the jurisdiction of the District Court 
vis-a-vis the Bar, if true, would create a grand anomaly in 
our system of adversary jurisprudence. Because the Supreme 
Court has the exclusive power to make the rules regarding 
the practice of law in Utah (Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4), 
because the Supreme Court essentially empowered the Bar to 
act as the Court's agent (Rules for Integration & Management 
of the Utah State Bar), because the Supreme Court approves 
all rules enacted by the Utah State Bar, (Id.), and because 
the Utah State Bar and its agents are completely subservient 
to the Utah Supreme Court, if exclusive jurisdiction over 
Bar activities lays only in the Supreme Court, then in 
adversary actions, this Court must sit in judgment of claims 
of mis-conduct against Bar employees or challenges to Bar 
rules or practices. Such legislative, administrative and 
judicial functions should not be combined in one omnipotent 
body from which there would be no appeal! Such a despotic 
governance is not appropriate -- not even for attorneys. 
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POINT III 
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE ACTUALLY 
IN THE RECORD AND BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
PROVES THAT PLAINTIFF PERFORMED EXTENSIVE 
PRE-FILING RESEARCH IN AN UNSETTLED 
AREA OF THE LAW. 
Jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and is not 
determined as a factual issue. Nonetheless, the plaintiff 
submitted affidavits from eight (8) Salt Lake City attorneys 
setting forth the results of research regarding jurisdiction 
of a district court in a case such as this. Those affida-
vits were submitted not to establish the law. However, 
those affidavits show that the law is, at least, unclear as 
to the jurisdiction of a district court in a case such as 
this. Obviously, there is honest difference of opinion as 
to which court has original jurisdiction over cases against 
the Utah State Bar. Plaintiff's choice, not inconsistent 
with the opinions of eight experienced area attorneys, 
cannot be described as an abuse of the legal process. 
A. The Evidence Properly Before The Trial Court 
Demonstrates That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Levying Rule 11 Sanctions. 
Plaintiff's two (2) affidavits set out the facts 
underlying his complaint and his legal research in prepara-
tion of this case. (Exhibits "B" & "C"). Those affidavits 
recite that he could find no law that prohibited the filing 
in district court, and establish more than a reasonable 
investigation as to the applicable law prior to the filing. 
Eight (8) other attorneys also researched the issue and 
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concluded that the district court had subject matter juris-
diction in this case (Exhibits ffDff-flK"). Those 
uncontroverted affidavits establish that the law in this 
case is not clear. Id. 
Plaintiff submitted that evidence twice -- once in 
support of an objection to the imposition of sanctions and 
fees, and the second time in support of a motion for a new 
trial. Judge Hanson struck that evidence the first time 
submitted, (Order of March 14, 1990, Exhibit "M" attached) 
but, the Court considered all of that evidence the second 
time submitted when considering plaintiff's Motion for a New 
Trial. 
On March 22, 1990 plaintiff moved for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Rule 59 and Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, 767 P.2d 125, 99 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
25 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). In support of that motion, the 
plaintiff re-submitted the pertinent pleadings. All of 
those pleadings were before the court when Judge Hanson 
considered plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
In considering plaintiff's motion for a new trial, 
ignoring the uncontroverted evidence, the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
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B. Defendants' Evidence Does Not Even Suggest That 
Plaintiff Flagrantly Abused Legal Process. 
Defendants cite only two (2) items in support of 
plaintiff's alleged lack of reasonable inquiry into the law. 
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Reversal 
Motion, p. 10, June 12, 1990. 
First, defendants note that plaintiff filed his suit 
five (5) hours after the phone call in which co-defendant 
Sutliff refused to provide the information that was the 
subject of plaintiff's action. Obviously, plaintiff's 
extensive research (Second Affidavit, Exhibit "D") was 
completed long before the fateful phone call to Ms. Sutliff. 
A lack of research is not proven by the five (5) hour delay 
in filing the suit. 
Second, defendants note that more than two (2) months 
after filing this suit, plaintiff stated that the Utah 
Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to discipline 
7 
attorneys. Id., p. 3, 10. The Petition filed at that time 
7. Such a statement does not confer jurisdiction on this 
Court or remove it from the District Court. Neither does 
such a statement create case law to justify the ruling of 
the Court below. The cited statement is: 
25. The Petitioner has no other plain, speedy or 
adequate relief available other than this Petition 
for an extraordinary writ. The Respondents 
herein, [Bar Counsel and the assigned Screening 
Panel] the Utah State Bar and its Commission have 
no power to amend the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar without approval of this Court, 
(footnote continued) 
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before this Court was not a duplicate of the complaint filed 
in District Court. Plaintiff's choice to seek an 
extraordinary writ from this Court was entirely proper. See 
footnote 7. Further, plaintiff's decisions of legal 
strategy in no way constitute a flagrant abuse of legal 
process. 
Neither of defendants' two "facts" support the conclu-
sion that plaintiff knew or should have known that the 
District Court lacks jurisdiction over policies of the Utah 
State Bar and actions of its staff. The ten (10) affidavits 
submitted establish plaintiff's pre-filing research was 
reasonable, that the law is (at least) unclear, and that 
plaintiff did not violate Rule 11. There is no evidence to 
support the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff. 
The trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 
(footnote continued) 
The Respondents herein, the Utah State Bar and its 
Commission have no power to determine that a Rule 
of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar is defective, unconstitutional or unenforce-
able. This Court has the exclusive jurisdiction 
to discipline attorneys; therefore, this action 
could not be filed in District Court. 
p. 8, Verified Petition, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 
89-0445, October 13, 1989. 
The relief sought in that Petition before this Court includ-
ed proposed amendments to the Procedures of Discipline; such 
relief is exclusively within the rule-making jurisdiction of 
this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff made a reasonable inquiry as to the law prior 
to filing the action• 
The law is not clear that a District Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar, its 
agents, and its governance of the practice of law. 
Sanctions under Rule 11 were not warranted by the 
applicable law or the facts of this case. 
RELIEF 
The decision, judgment and order of the trial court 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions and assessing attorney fees 
should be reversed. 
DATED this 20th day of JULY, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of JULY, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed four (4) copies of the above and forego-
ing pleading BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Defendants & 
Respondents 
175 East 4th South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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EXHIBITS 
"A" Complaint of August 2, 1989 
"B" Affidavit of Plaintiff 
MC" Second Affidavit of Plaintiff 
"D" Affidavit of JAMES AUSENBAUGH 
"E" Affidavit of JOHN B. MAYCOCK 
"F" Affidavit of ROBERT BREEZE 
"G" Affidavit of G. STEPHEN SULLIVAN 
"H" Affidavit of KEVIN ANDERSON 
"I" Affidavit of ROSS ANDERSON 
"J" Affidavit of GARY FERGUSON 
"KM Affidavit of MARK GUSTAVSON 
tlT If 
»!/->«« 
MT>lt 
L" Ruling of February 12, 1990 imposing 
sanctions 
*M" Ruling of March 14, 1990 overruling 
plaintiff's objection to sanctions and 
setting fee award 
•N" Final Order of April 23, 1990 
0" Judgment of April 23, 1990 
P" Order of May 2, 1990 Denying New Trial 
"Q" Notice of Appeal of May 3, 1990 
"R" Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 3 
§ 4 
§ 5 
"S" Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended) 
"T" Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) 
* * * * * 
As of July 19, 1990, the Third District Court Clerk had 
not indexed the trial record. Thus, reference to pages of 
the trial record is impossible. For convenience, plaintiff 
has attached as exhibits the documents relied upon herein. 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-3204 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. 9 ^ 0 * 1 ( ^ 1 / 1 0 t\/ 
THE PLAINTIFF, Brian M. Barnard as a cause of action 
states as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is an attorney licensed to practice 
law in Utah. 
2. The defendant Toni M. Sutliff is the Assistant Bar 
Counsel of the Utah State Bar. At all times pertinent to 
this action, she was acting as the agent and employee of the 
Utah State Bar. 
3. The Utah State Bar is a governmental agency which 
has been delegated certain powers to regulate the practice 
of law in the state of Utah including administering disci-
pline. Suit against the Utah State Bar is authorized by 
T PLAINTIFF'S 
I EXHIBIT 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendant. 
Utah statutes and by the Rules of Integration and Management 
of the Utah State Bar as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
4. As Assistant Bar Counsel, the defendant Sutliff has 
commenced a disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff in 
the name of and on behalf of the Utah State Bar. Said 
disciplinary action is based upon false allegations by the 
former spouse of a client of the plaintiff; the allegations 
were made after the former spouse lost in a divorce modi-
fication and enforcement proceeding. 
5. In a letter to plaintiff dated July 28f 1989 
regarding said disciplinary action, the defendant Sutliff 
stated "I have therefore set this matter for review by a 
Screening Panel (of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Utah State Bar J, • . ." 
6. On August 2, 1989 at approximately 10:15 a.m., the 
plaintiff in a telephone conversation with the defendant 
Sutliff asked for the names of the members of the Screening 
Panel to which the matter had been referred. The defendant 
Sutliff stated that the matter had not yet been referred to 
a Screening Panel, but would be later referred to such a 
Panel. 
7. Plaintiff stated that he would waive any further 
preliminary consideration and requested that the matter be 
immediately assigned to a Screen Panel and that he be 
informed as soon as the matter was assigned as to the names 
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of the members of the Panel. Defendant Sutliff stated that 
she would not do so. 
8. Defendant Sutliff stated that the policy of the 
Utah State Bar is not to reveal the names of the Screening 
Panel members until the attorney actually appears for the 
hearing before that Panel. Defendant Sutliff stated that 
she would not provide the plaintiff with the names of the 
members of the Screening Panel prior to the actual hearing 
to consider the matter. 
9. The plaintiff is entitled to know in advance the 
composition of the Screening Panel that will hear the 
matter. Plaintiff is entitled within the bounds of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar to have access 
to said members. 
10. The refusal of the defendants to provide the 
plaintiff with said information and to allow him access to 
said panel members constitutes a denial of due process. 
11. The plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that 
unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, the defendants 
will continue to refuse to identify the membership of said 
Screening Panel. 
12. The plaintiff is entitled to and seeks a prelimi-
nary and permanent injunction against the defendants and 
each of them (and all officers, agents and employees of the 
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Utah State Bar) from proceeding forward on the above 
described disciplinary action until such time as they reveal 
to the plaintiff the names of the members of the Screening 
Panel that will review the matter. 
13. The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar 
make no provision for procedures as to assignment of pending 
disciplinary matters to Screening Panels of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar, The plaintiff 
believes and therefore alleges that the defendants, rather 
than randomly assigning and referring matters to Screening 
Panelsf select and assign disciplinary matters to specific 
panels to their benefit, based upon the composition of said 
Panels and to the possible prejudice of the responding 
attorney and thereby engage in improper "forum shopping/1 
denying due process to the respondent attorney and/or the 
plaintiff and denying to the responding attorney and/or the 
plaintiff a fair, non-prejudiced and impartial hearing 
panel. 
WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF demands a preliminary and 
permanent injunction against the defendants and each of them 
(and all officers, agents and employees of the Utah State 
Bar) from proceeding forward on the above described 
disciplinary action until such time as they reveal to the 
plaintiff the names of the members of the Screening Panel 
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that will review the matter. Plaintiff also seeks a 
preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants 
from assigning this disciplinary matter to any Screening 
Panel except by random selection. Plaintiff also seeks the 
costs of this action and such other and further relief as 
the Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
DATED this 2nd day of AUGUST, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
bkiAN y : BAfetfAto 7 * 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SS, 
THE ABOVE NAMED PARTY, BRIAN M. BARNARD personally 
appeared before me, a notary public, on the date above 
written, and having been duly sworn upon oath acknowledged 
to me that he was the person that had executed the above and 
foregoing document, having read and understood it, and 
knowing the contents thereof to be true and correct, and 
swearing to the truth thereof, and having voluntarily 
subscribed his name thereto intending to be bound thereby. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 
USB # 0215 
84111 - 3204 
Telephone: ^801) 328-9531 or 328-0532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
SS. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been dxily sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this action. 
2. On August 2, 1989 at 10:15 a.m., I had a telephone 
conversation with the defendant Toni Marie Sutliff, Assis-
tant Bar Counsel regarding a disciplinary matter pending 
against me. 
3. I spoke to her because I was informed that 
Christine Burdick was not available. (I believe I was told 
that Ms. Burdick was on vacation at that time.) When I 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT
 M 
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spoke to Ms, Sutliff, she told me that she (and not Ms. 
Burdick) was handling that particular disciplinary matter. 
4. In that phone conversation, I ask the names of the 
members of the Disciplinary Screening Panel to which the 
matter had been assigned. She told me the matter had not 
yet been assigned to such a panel. (A letter dated July 28f 
1989 had lead me to believe that the matter had already been 
assigned to a panel.) Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8. 
5. In that phone conversation, I then ask Ms, Sutliff 
ift once the matter was assigned to a Screening Panelf she 
would provide me with the names of the members of the 
assigned Disciplinary Screening Panel. She refused. 
Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8. 
6. In response, Ms. Sutliff specifically said that she 
would NOT inform me of the composition of the Screening 
Panel even after the matter was assigned to a panel. She 
stated that it was the policy of the Office of Bar Counsel 
not to inform the complained of attorney the make-up of the 
panel prior to the hearing. Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8. 
7. At her deposition taken in this case on September 
8, 1989, defendant Toni Sutliff again confirmed under oath 
that on August 2, 1989, she told me she would not give me 
the names of the Screening Panel members even after the case 
was assigned to a screening panel. 
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8. I needed the names of the members of the Screening 
Panel for two (2) reasons -- to determine if a motion for 
recusal was appropriate, and to commence legal action 
against the panel members. Therefore, I filed this action 
on August 2, 1989 seeking the names of the panel members. 
9. After filing this suit, Ms. Burdick informed me by 
letter of September 6, 1989 of the names of the Panel 
members to which my disciplinary matter was then assigned. 
Ms. Burdick1s letter of September 6, specifically refers to 
my conversation with Ms. Sutliff of August 2nd, which was 
the basis of this suit. 
10. After Ms. Burdick countermanded Ms. Sutliffs 
position iind provided me the names of the panel members, I 
voluntarily dismissed this action on September 11, 1989. 
11. After provided with the names of the panel mem-
bers, I suggested that a conflict of interest existed with 
the Chair of the Screening Panel. In response, the matter 
was re-assigned to another screening panel. 
12. On October 13, 1989, I filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ in the Utah Supreme Court regarding the 
pending disciplinary action against me, Case No. 89-0445. 
Exhibit "B" to Defendants* Memorandum. That action chal-
lenged on due process grounds certain of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar. In that action I named as 
respondents the individual members of the panel before whom 
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the disciplinary matter was then pending. That Supreme 
Court action was successful and the Procedures of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar have been substantially changed as a 
result. 
13. (a) I filed this action in good faith and based 
upon the clear and direct refusal of Toni Marie Sutliff to 
reveal to me that names of the Screening Panel members even 
after the matter was assigned to a panel. 
(b) I believed upon filing this action and 
believe now that I am entitled to know the names of the 
members of an assigned Screening Panel sufficiently in 
advance of the hearing to seek recusal and/or if 
appropriate, commence legal action against them. 
14. I filed this action to protect my interests and 
rights in a disciplinary action pending before the Utah 
State Bar. I did not file this action for any improper 
motive or purpose. At the time I filed this action, I 
honestly believed that this action was proper. I continue 
to so believe. But for the filing of this actionf I believe 
that the Office of Bar Counsel and Ms. Sutliff would not 
have provided me with the names of the Screening Panel 
members. 
15. My only possible error in this action was filing 
it in this Court rather than as an original petition before 
the Utah Supreme Court. I sought to enlist the aid of the 
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broad equitable powers of this court. Such a defect (if 
that it be) is not a violation of Rule 11 or Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The relief sought in this 
action would clearly be available from the Utah Supreme 
Courtf and merely filing an action in the wrong court is not 
cause for sanctions. 
16. By way of an explanation as to filing in this 
Court, I present the following: prior to this suit, I filed 
two (2) other actions against the Utah State Bar in this 
Court: Case No. 88-0578, Judge Homer Wilkinson and Case No. 
88-0801, Judge Pat Brian. Each of those actions involved 
aspects of the practice of law, the licensing of lawyers in 
Utah, or functioning of the Utah State Bar, all issues which 
appear at first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Utah Supreme Court. Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4. 
In each of those actions, the defendants moved to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction and in each case those motions were 
not granted. 
17. After dismissal of this action, I sought through a 
rule making petition amendments to the Procedures of Disci-
pline of the Utah State Bar ordering the Office of Bar 
Counsel to inform accused attorneys as to the names of 
members of Screening Panels immediately upon assignment to 
the panel, and to change the procedures for assignment of 
5 
matters to disciplinary panels. Utah Supreme Court, Case 
No. 89-0423 
18. 1 have repeatedly attempted to resolve disputes 
with the Utah State Bar Commissioners short of litigation. 
They and their legal counsel refuse to discuss possible 
non-litigation resolution. Avenues "more reasonable and 
less adversarial and less costly11 than litigation are not 
available to me, largely because of the attitude and conduct 
of the Commission and its staff. 
19. As recently as November 1, 1989 I informed Steven 
Hutchinson that I thought having to defend suits brought 
against the Utah State liar was Ma poor way to spend funds 
and resources of the Utah State Bar" and a foolish way to 
spend Bar tnonty. I have repeatedly suggested, to no avail, 
that the use of simple openness would resolve many of the 
disputes that I have with the Bar. In that letter of 
November 1st I was requesting that the Bar provide me with 
information as to its 1989 lobbying activities. The Bar is 
now required to provide me the precise type of information 
that I requested. The Bar is so required, not because of 
cooperation, but because of litigation and a petition to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
20. I have no desire tfto interfere with the orderly 
functioning of the [Utah State] Bar." I simply seek to 
encourage the Utah State Bar, its Commission and staff to 
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function fairly, openly and honestly within the bounds of 
the law and the Constitution and within the mandate from the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
21. As an active and dues paying mandatory member of 
the Utah State Bar, I shall continue to express my opinions 
and make suggestions regarding the operations and actions of 
the staff and Commission of the Utah State Bar, 1st Amend,., 
U.S. Const. 
22. I am an active member of the Utah State Barf 
having chaired the annual "Sub-for-Santa" project and the 
Annual Blood Drive of the Young Lawyer Section, for more 
than eleven (11+) years. The Bar recently published (Novem-
ber 1989) an article in the Utah Bar Journal that I 
co-authored regarding the ethical duty of attorneys to 
represent indigent prison inmates in civil rights actions. 
I am chair of a Utah State Bar Young Lawyer Section project 
to create an endowment to fund an annual award as a part of 
a Salt Lake County-wide high school blood drive program. 
Two years ago, I donated one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) to 
a special committee of the Utah State Bar (upon which I 
served) to help commemorate the Bicentennial of the signing 
of the United States Constitution. 
23. The list of my litigation against the Utah State 
Bar appended to Steven Hutchinson's Affidavit is incomplete. 
My litigation began in 1976 or 1977 when I successfully 
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challenged the Bar's total ban on advertising by lawyers. 
Since then I have successfully litigated other aspects of 
lawyer advertising against the Utah State Bar. I also 
successfully sued the Utah State Bar for violation of the 
First Amendment for unlawful censorship relative to its 
former publication, the UTAH BAR LETTER. Several of those 
lawsuits have resulted in the Utah State Bar having to pay 
substantial attorney fees to me. 
DATED thir, 16th day of JANUARY, 1990. 
-, Y , x-
• BRIAN M. BA1 iARNARD 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN, 
My comm. expires: 
Notary Public . . ! 
•70200.400 
Sa&UfcoCH* Utah 84111. 
KVCofnmMM Expires I 
*SB!lWFJ 
:Mc... //l((/r-/h. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
8 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of JANUARY, 1990, 
I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
pleading AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff » 
" .** ^'? 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 
•« \.u f<n 
USB
 * 02^LA^ £ odmet. 
84111 - 3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
SECOND 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
SS. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states on personal knowledge as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this action. I am an attor-
ney admitted to practice before this Court and the Courts of 
the State of Utah. I have practiced law since 1969. 
2. Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched the law 
applicable to this action and specifically the jurisdiction 
of this court to hear matters regarding the operations of 
the Utah State Bar. 
(a) In doing so, I reviewed all of the Rules for 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, the Rules 
(0 
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of Professional Conduct and the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar to determine if there was any law, rule, 
statute or regulation which required actions challenging 
actions by the Utah State Bar be brought only in the Utah 
Supreme Court. I found none. 
(b) I read Ut. Code Ann. S§ 78-2-1 et seq (1953 as 
amended) and Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 3, dealing with juris-
diction of the Utah Supreme Court. 
(c) Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended) 
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme 
Court regarding matters of lawyer discipline. There is no 
provision in that statute for original or exclusive juris-
diction before the Supreme Court regarding matters of lawyer 
discipline. 
(d) Art. VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and appellate jurisdiction 
over other matters as provided by statute. There is no 
provision in that constitutional article for original or 
exclusive jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding 
matters of lawyer discipline. That provision provides for 
concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts for the 
issuance of extraordinary writs. 
(e) I read Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as amend-
ed) which provides that by rule by Utah Supreme Court shall 
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govern the practice of law, including admissions and disci-
pline. There is no provision in that statute for original 
or exclusive jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding 
matters of discipline, 
(f) I read Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4 which provides 
that by rule by Utah Supreme Court shall govern the practice 
of law, including admissions and discipline. That provision 
deals only with the rule making powers of the Supreme Courtf 
That provision does not deal with jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. There is nothing in that provision which 
would prevent the bringing of this action in this Court. 
(g) I read Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-3-1 et seq (1953 as 
amended) and Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 5, dealing with juris-
diction of the Utah District Courts and other courts* I 
found nothing in those provisions that prohibited the 
bringing of this action in this Court. Specifically, I 
noted ,fThe district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law." Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) 
(1953 as amended). Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 5 has a similar 
broad jurisdictional statement. I looked for any specific 
provision in the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes to 
prohibit the bringing of this action in the District Court 
and found that there was none. 
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(h) Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) and Ut. 
Const. Art. VIII, § 5 provide that the District Court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to issue 
extraordinary writs. This case sought only an injunction 
and declaratory relief„ 
3. Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched and I 
reviewed the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court to determine if there was any rule or 
regulation which required actions seeking injunctive relief 
against and/or challenging action by the Utah State Bar be 
brought only in the Utah Supreme Court. I found there was 
no such provision. 
4. Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched and I 
reviewed the Pacific Digest to determine if there was any 
Utah case law which established that actions challenging 
action by the Utah State Bar or its agents be brought only 
in the Utah Supreme Court. I found no such reported case 
law. 
5. Prior to filing this lawsuit, I researched and 
reviewed all of the reported cases of the Utah Supreme Court 
dealing with lawyer discipline since 1970 to determine if 
there was any reported Utah case law which established that 
actions challenging actions by the Utah State Bar be brought 
only in the Utah Supreme Court. There is no such reported 
case law. 
4 
6. Prior to filing this suit, I had personally filed 
two (2) other actions against the Utah State Bar in this 
Court: 
(a) Case No. 88-0578, assigned to Judge Homer 
Wilkinson, and 
(b) Case No. 88-0801, assigned to Judge Pat Brian. 
Each of those actions involved aspects of the practice 
of law, the licensing of lawyers in Utah, or functioning of 
the Utah State Bar. In each of those actions, the defendant] 
officers of the Bar sought dismissal for lack of jurisdic-
tion. In Case No. 88-0578 Judge Wilkinson specifically 
denied the request to dismiss made by defendants therein. 
In Case No. 88-0801, Judge Brian has yet to rule on the 
jurisdictional issue. 
7. Plaintiff also represented a party in R. Owen 
Neerings v. Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807 (Judge 
J. Sawaya, filed June, 1988) dealing with the operations of 
the Utah State Bar related to the bar exam and the privacy 
of results of the bar exam. Judge Sawaya found that this 
Court had jurisdiction, and in early 1989, resolved the case 
on its merits. 
8. The defendants have yet to cite any case law or 
other legal authority from the State of Utah that required 
the filing of this action before the Utah Supreme Court 
rather than in this court. Defendants1 Reply Memo Re: 
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Sanctions, p. 3; Defendants' Memo Seeking Sanctions, p. 8; 
Defendants' Memo Re: Motion to Dismiss, pp. 2 - 5. 
9. The only Utah authority that defendants have cited 
to support their claim of lack of jurisdiction is Ut. Const. 
VIII, § 4, dealing with rule making powers of the Court and 
not dealing with jurisdiction, which provides in pertinent 
part: 
The supreme court by rule shall govern the prac-
tice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted 
to practice. 
10. Pursuant to that provision. Art. VIII, § 4 , 1 
understand that the Utah Supreme Court has the exclusive 
power to create and modify rules regarding the discipline of 
attorneys. That provision concerns only its rule making 
powers. That section provides for the separation of powers 
and provides that the executive and legislative branches of 
government shall not be involved in the governance of the 
practice of law, an exclusive function of the judiciary. 
Art. VIII, § 4 does not suggest that the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in adversary proceedings to hear legal chal-
lenges to disciplinary proceedings. I have found no cases 
that support such a suggestion. Art. VIII, § 4 and encom-
passes the governance of all aspects of the practice of law 
not solely lawyer discipline. 
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11. After my research as set forth above, I was able 
to find no preclusion to bringing a suit in equity in this 
Court to enjoin or to challenge procedures in that disci-
plinary process. 
12. (a) In adversary case, Barnard v. Sutliff, et al, 
Case No. 89-0445 filed in the Utah Supreme Court a month 
after this case was dismissed, (Exhibit "B11 to Defendants* 
Memo Re: Sanctions), I sought substantial modifications of 
the Procedures of Discipline because of due process defects 
therein. That relief was not sought in this action. I did 
not request that this Court in this action alter or amend 
the Procedures of Discipline (which only the Utah Supreme 
Court can do.) In that adversary proceeding, using its rule 
making powers, the Utah Supreme Court did alter the Proce-
dures of Discipline. Minute Entry, Exhibit ,fMH attached. 
(b) My references in that adversary Petition 
(Id., 1 2, p. 2; 1 25, p. 8) to the exclusive power of the 
Supreme Court were meant to refer to its power to adopt and 
change the disciplinary rules and the procedures of lawyer 
discipline, the relief sought in that Petition. 
13. To the best of ray knowledge, information and 
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry as described above, 
I believed that the filing of this action in this court was 
warranted by existing law, or by a good faith argument for 
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the clarification, extension, or modification of existing 
law. 
14. Based upon my experience and knowledge of this 
case, the fees claimed by defendants1 counsel are excessive. 
The preparation and filing of the motion to dismiss and the 
motion for sanctions herein along with their supporting 
memorandums, and the resolution of this case, should not 
have required the expenditure of almost five thousand 
dollars ($5,000.00) in fees and costs by attorneys with the 
knowledge, training and experience of Carmen Kipp and Robert 
Rees. The costs and expenses claimed by the defendants1 
counsel, under the common practice of attorneys in the Salt 
Lake City area, should be absorbed in overhead expenses 
reflected by the hourly rates of counsel and not charged in 
addition to those hourly fees. 
DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990. 
i*!:,. i HIS !P> A -I..U = C O P / Or AN 
r 'u>'::IT or ,v- ::• THE THIRD 
• >». SALT L,V;.. < ". v< ry. STATE OF 
; ; 
DEPUTY COURT CLERX 
M./BifcR!JAR BRIAN .f BARN D 
Plaintiff / Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN 
BY BRIAN M. BARNARD. 
LARENEM.WALDRON I 
Coll Utat City; Utah 04111! 
f.ty Commission Expire* 1 
—Xfinjry 10, toga | 
r^Ct^iiiJddc 
2a»«tU&ii 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 
•-''UD 
C./^ 
- * ,'3-i *A, 
USB # 0215 
84111 - 320A 
*«-- <<w 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAMES AUSENBAUGH 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS, 
JAMES AUSENBAUGH having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the 
Supreme Court of Utah and this Court. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched 
the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its 
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in an 
zjol 
< m 
attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in a District 
Court in Utah. 
3. I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah 
that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a 
case. 
4. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended) 
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme 
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline. 
5. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives 
the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." 
6. I am aware of Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4 granting 
the Utah Supreme Court the power to, by rule, regulate the 
practice of law. In my opinion that provision does not 
preclude a District Court from exercising equitable powers 
to prevent mis-conduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge 
procedures in attorney disciplinary actions. I have found 
no law that contradicts that opinion. 
DATED this ^ Z ^ day of FEBRUARY, 1990. 
JAMB^JUJSENBAUGH 
Affiant 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN 
BY JAMES AUSENBAUGH. 
My comm. expires: ^//^t^/yJ (7. /fr/m***— 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
/Ada JStt /??# Residing at Salt Lake County 
St.my ' ' STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 89-0904670 
Barnard v. Sutliff 
Affidavit of James Ausenbaugh 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the^&g, day of FEBRUARY, 
1990, I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and forego-
ing pleading AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES AUSENBAUGH to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for PlaintiJ 
> • •> i i ; • - . 
' ' • '". '.! 1,1)1*/ I uOf 
DIPUTY COU'Vi OMVC 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 02 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111 - 3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN B. MAYCOCK 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
JOHN B. MAYCOCK having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the 
Supreme Court of Utah and this Court. I have practiced law 
in Utah for fifteen (15) years, concentrating primarily in 
civil litigation. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched 
whether a Utah District Court has jurisdiction over an 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
V 
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action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the 
Utah State Bar and its counsel regarding procedures followed 
and bar counsel's conduct in an attorney disciplinary 
matter. 
3. I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah 
that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a 
case. 
4. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended) 
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme 
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline. 
5. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives 
the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." 
6. I am aware of the provisions of Utah Constitution, 
Art. VIII, §§3 and 5 concerning original and appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the District Courts and 
other state courts. I am also aware of Utah Constitution 
Art. VIII, § 4 requiring the Utah Supreme Court to govern, 
by rule, the practice of law including the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law, 
7. In my opinion, the argument that the District 
Court, and not the Supreme Court, has original jurisdiction 
over this action is warranted by the existing law cited 
o 
above, or by a good faith argument for the extension of such 
existing law. 
DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990. 
B. MAYCOCK 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN 
BY JOHN B. MAYCOCK. 
My comm. expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 89-0904670 
Barnard v. Sut11ff 
Affidavit of John B. Maycock 
• •.'•> DOCI;.V:;VJT CM RLE HI IHH THIRD 
. •. .rjTi 001 iivi, OALT LA:CI: co Jrjrv, STATE OF 
OGPU ry ct JuriT CLC^X 
3 
c«» .... 
/ SJ J l 1 •«! 
USB # 0215 BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake Citv, UTAH 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
84111 - 3204 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT BREEZF 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS, 
ROBERT BREEZE having been duly sworn upon oath deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I an an attorney admitted to practice before the 
Supreme Court of Utah and this Court. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched 
the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its 
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in ap. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in a District 
Court in Utah. 
3. I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah 
that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in ruch a 
case. 
4. Ut. Code Am. ? 78-2-7 (3)(c) (1953 as amended) 
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme 
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline. 
5. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives 
the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." . • , 
6. I am aware of Utah Const, Art. VIII, § 4 granting 
the Utah Supreme Court the power to, by rule, regulate the 
practice of law. In my opinion that provision does not 
preclude a District Court from exercising equitable powers 
to prevent mis-conduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge 
procedures in attorney disciplinary actions. I have found 
no law that contradicts that opinion. 
DATED this ^ - 3 day of FEBRUARY, 1990. 
ROBERT BREEZE ^ ^ ^ . 
Affiant 
*» 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN 
BY ROBERT BREEZE. 
My coram, expires: 
Case No. 89-0904670 
Barnard v. Sutliff 
Affidavit of Robert Breeze 
Ck 
/ 
/?-tf//tt f/4 T S£}TARY PUBLIC 
/Res id ing t^-_ Sal t Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ " d a y of FEBRUARY, 
1990, I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and forego-
ing pleading AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BREEZE to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP k CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Jilaintiff. 
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BRIAN M BARNARD - USB#0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
~***c 
1 
* # ' * 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF G. 
i STEVEN SULLIVAN 
i Civil No. 89-0904670 
i Judge T.R. Hanson 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
G„ STEVEN SULLIVAN having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the 
Supreme Court of Utah and this Court. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched 
the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its counsel 
regarding the procedures and their conduct in an attorney 
disciplinary matter could be brought in a District Court in Utah. 
0* 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
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3. I have found no statute, rule or case lav/ in Utah 
that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a case. 
4. Ut. Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3){c) (1953 as amended) 
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme Court 
as to matters of lawyer discipline. 
5. Ut. Code Ann. §79-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives 
the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited 
by law.-
6. I am aware of Utah Const. Art. VIII# §4 granting 
the Utah Supreme Court the power to, by rule, regulate the 
practice of law. In my opinion that provision does not preclude 
a District Court from exercising equitable powers to prevent mis-
conduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge procedures in attorney 
disciplinary actions. I have found no law that contradicts that 
opinion. 
DATED this 2*{p day of February, /990, 
Zl G. ^TEVEN SUL 
Aff ia i t t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN BY G. 
STEVEN SULLIVAN. 
I»9* -S 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SHIRLEY J. 8ROWM 
?102 Newcastle Ortvt 
Sandy Ulan 84093 
,fSTOaftwSs 
w UTAH j 
ARY Ptf#Ll# / y p 
idin^ T at xW^t^^aAjp^ 
Case No. 89-0904670 
Barnard v. Sutliff 
Affidavit of G. Steven Sullivan 
y i 
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D1PUI YCf.'jr; .•(,(_;:,; 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 
1990, I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
pleading AFFIDAVIT OF G. STEVEN SULLIVAN to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RIAN M. BARNARJ^" 
0001.gss / 
/ 
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?SUi> 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake Citv, UTAH 
USB # 0215 
84111 - 3204 
•n 
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Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KEVIN N. ANDERSON 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
KEVIN N. ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes andf of 
his own personal knowledge, states: 
1. I obtained my juris doctorem from Georgetown 
University Law Center in 1981, and was admitted to practice 
before the Supreme Court of Utah and this Court in 1981. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched 
the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and 
PLAINTIFF 
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its counsel regarding their conduct in an attorney disciplinary 
matter could be brought in a District Court in Utah. 
3. I have found no constitutional provision, statute, 
rule or case law in Utah which would deny the District Court 
jurisdiction in such a case, Utah Const, art. VIII, S 5 and Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-3-4 give the District Court original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, except as limited by the Con-
stitution or by statute. 
4. Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2(3)(c) provides only for 
appellant jurisdiction before the Supreme Court as to matters of 
lawyer discipline. That section also specifically denotes those 
situations where original jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court. 
Disciplinary actions are not listed as being in the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction. 
5. I am aware of Utah Const, art. VIII# $ 4 granting 
the Utah Supreme Court the power to regulate the practice of law. 
In my opinion, invoking the jurisdiction of a District Court to 
exercise its equitable powers to prevent misconduct of bar coun-
sel and/or to challenge whether bar counsel properly followed the 
procedures established by the Supreme Court in attorney disci-
plinary actions is warranted by existing law or, in good faith, 
an argument for the extension of existing law. I have found no 
law that contradicts that opinion. 
-2-
DATED this «>LV3 day of February, 1990. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^ £ ? day of 
February, 1990. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC I, . U I 6 l . , l Residing At; jSOltU^ tfruh.ti4d\ 
llXtUf-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of February, 
1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing Affi-
davit of Kevin N. Anderson to the following: 
Robert H. Rees, Esq. 
Kipp & Christian 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f „ ( 
214 E a s t F i f t h S o u t h r-- .\<^ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 ~ ? - . , ? . . 
Phone : (801) 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUftT^N AND FOR ' "- .'./ *<? 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTtfJfcL X^ S.v' 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTL1FF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROSS C. ANDERSON 
Hon. T.R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ROSS C. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, the Supreme Court of Utah and this Court 
and have been actively engaged in the private practice of law, primarily in the 
area o( civil litigation, for more than 11 years. 
2. Brian M. Barnard has advised me that Rule 11 sanctions are being 
sought against him in the above-captioned matter because he commenced an 
action in the Third Judicial District Court, rather than the Utah Supreme Court, 
for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its counsel 
regarding an attorney disciplinary matter* 
3. From my review of the applicable constitutional and statutory 
provisions, it appears to me that if there are Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed, 
they should be assessed against the person or entity urging that Mr. Barnard should 
be penalized for filing the action in District Court. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
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4. If I were going to file an action against the Utah State Bar 
relating to due process violations in disciplinary matters, I would commence the 
action in District Court for the following reasons: 
a. Article VIII, S 5 of the Utah Constitution provides that H[t]he 
District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute . . ." 
b. I have found no constitutional provision or statute depriving 
the District Court of jurisdiction in an action seeking injunctive and declaratory 
relief with respect to attorney discipline matters. The only constitutional 
provision even remotely related to the issue is Article VIJI, § 4, which simply 
provides that lf[t]he supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law, 
including • . . the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law" 
[emphasis added]; that constitutional provision does not vest the Utah Supreme 
Court with exclusive or original jurisdiction in attorney discipline matters. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Barnard was not seeking governance by rule nor challenging the 
rules promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court, but, rather, was seeking equitable 
relief under existing law, Article VIII, § 4 is not relevant to this case. 
c. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(c) provides that the Utah 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over discipline of lawyers. Nothing in 
§ 78-2-2 indicates in any way that the Utah Supreme Court would have original or 
exclusive jurisdiction in an action seeking the injunctive and declaratory relief 
sought by Mr. Barnard in his Complaint in the above-referenced matter. 
d. Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(1) provides that the District Court 
"has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the 
-2-
Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Inasmuch as there is no relevant 
exception in the Utah Constitution and the exercise of original jurisdiction by the 
District Court in this matter is not prohibited by law, it clearly appears that the 
District Court, not the Utah Supreme Court, is the proper court for the 
commencement of this case. 
5. Based upon the well-known antagonism between Mr. Barnard and 
the officials of the Utah State Bar, of which this Court can probably take judicial 
notice, I am extremely concerned that the Utah State Bar and its counsel are 
resorting to baseless and untenable arguments merely in an effort to punish Mr. 
Barnard for his extensive litigation against the Utah State Bar. 
6. Rule 11 provides, in part, that an attorney's signature on a 
pleading constitutes a "certificate by him that he has read the pleading . . . ; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it 
is not interposed for any improper purpose . • . " According to my research and 
understanding of the law, Mr. Barnard was justified in invoking the jurisdiction of 
the District Court, rather than the Utah Supreme Court, in this action and cannot 
be reasonably found to have violated Rule 11 in his determination that this action 
should be commenced in District Court. 
DATED this«2>today of February, 1990. 
Ross C. Anderson „ 
50 West Broadway, #700 •x* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &?Utl day of February, 
1990, by Ross C. Anderson. 
My Commission Expires: 
12-03-90 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 
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Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0904670 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GARY B. FERGUSON 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
THE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT OF GARY B. FERGUSON is submitted 
by the plaintiff herein. 
DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990. 
BRIAN M.^BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Gary B. Ferguson, under oath, upon personal 
knowledge, states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before 
the Supreme Court of Utah and a member in good standing of the 
Utah State Bar. 
2. At the request of Brian M. Barnard, Z 
researched the question as to whether an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its 
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in an 
attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in the district 
court in Utah. 
3. I have found no statute, rule or case law in 
Utah that would deny the district court jurisdiction in such a 
case. 
4. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that: f,The district court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs.11 
5. Section 78-3-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), gives the district court "original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not accepted in the 
Constitution and not prohibited by law." 
6. Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that: "The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law.11 [Emphasis added]. 
7. Section 78-2-2# Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) provides that: 
(2) The Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs 
and process necessary to carry into 
effect its orders, judgments, and 
decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
. . . . 
(c) Discipline of lawyers; [Emphasis 
added]. 
8. In my opinion, the jurisdiction of the 
district court, as outlined in Article VIII, Section 4 and 
§78-3-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) includes 
jurisdiction to prevent misconduct of bar counsel, or other 
challenges to the procedures in the attorney disciplinary 
actions. If the Supreme Court were to determine that my 
opinion is incorrect, that determination would be one of first 
impression in the State of Utah. 
9* It is my opinion that the power given to the 
Supreme Court by the State of Utah by Article VIII, Section 4 
2 
to the effect that: "The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the 
practice of law, including admissions to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law" is 
a quasi legislative and quasi executive function. This 
provision does not# in my opinion, give to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah sole judicial authority to review equal 
protection or due process complaints regarding disciplinary 
procedures followed by the Utah State Bar. If in fact the 
Utah Supreme Court concludes that it has this power solely unto 
itself, then this would be an extension, clarification or 
modification of existing law not known to any practitioner in 
the State of Utah prior to the Court fs issuing such a ruling. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT: 
DATED this06rLl day of fegZU A^\ . 1990 . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
. ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this %(A day of 2 ^ ., 1990, 
personally appeared before me Gary B. Fergi#on, who being first 
duly sworn# states that he has read the foregoing instrument, 
knows the contents contained therein are true and correct, and 
signs the same as his own free act. 
My Commission Expires: 
BERNARD/GBF 
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 Fast Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9521 
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IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FCP 
SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EPIAN r . PARNAPD. 
VS. 
TCMI 
UTAH 
Pla in t i f f , 
r. SUTLIFF and : 
STATE BAR, 
Defendants. : 
: Civil No. 8S-09C467C 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK 
(Hon. 
S. CUST/VSCf! 
T . F . Hanson) 
• ' • « • — » » • • 
STATF CF UTAH 
CCUf'TY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
f7PK S. CUST£VSCH, having been duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follews: 
1. I arr an attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of 
Utah and this Court, USB No. 127F. 
2. Ft the request of Prian f\ Parnard, Esq., I have researched the 
legal question regarding whether an action for injunctive and declaratory 
relief against the Utah State Bar and its counsel, regarding the offi-
cially-adopted procedures and conduct of the Utah State Bar in an attorney-
disciplinary matter, could be brought originally in a District Court in 
Utah. I understand that Mr. Barnard's challenge to the Bar was not focused 
on the individual, autonomous activity of Vs. Sutlifff but rather sought 
fmmam 
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relief against the decisions, procedures and policies of the Utah State Bar 
that have been carried out by Vs. Sutliff. 
3. I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah that would deny 
the District Court original jurisdiction in a case where an attorney is 
challenging the standards and procedures of the Utah State Par. This issue 
is distinct from an attorney-disciplinary matter where only the conduct of 
an individual attorney, when measured against the Code of Professional re-
sponsibility and other ethical constraints, is being determined and 
assessed. 
A. Ut. Code Ann. Section 78-2-2 (3) (c) (1953 as amended) provides 
only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding matters 
of lawyer discipline. Therefore, an action challenging the Bar's rules and 
procedures could not be brought originally in the Supreme Court assuming, 
^uencto, that the case could not, be brought originally in District Court. 
5. Ut. Code /nn. Section 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives the Dis-
trict Court "....original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law," 
6. I am aware cf the provisions Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 4 
which grants the Utah Supreme Court the power, by rule, to regulate the 
practice of law. In my opinion, that provision does not preclude a Dis-
trict Court from exercising original jurisdiction and equitable powers to 
prevent the actions of Par Counsel to the extent that such actions by Par 
Counsel carry out adopted procedures and rules of the Utah State Bar; such 
a circumstance is legally and factually distinct from an allegation of mis-
conduct against another individual attorney who, autonomously# acted in an 
unprofessional manner. I have found no law that contradicts that opinion. 
7. While the Utah Supreme has original jurisdiction regarding rules 
promulgated to regulate the Utah State Bar, such original jurisdiction is 
not exclusive jurisdiction. For the reason that certain sorts of civil 
actions can be brought in both Third Circuit and Third District Courts, 
even though both Courts have original jurisdiction, Mr. Barnard's action 
could be sensibly brought in Third District Court. 
lis day of DATED thi day of FEBRUARY 
MARK S. G 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN BY MARK S. GUS-
TAVSON. 
My commission expires: 
Case No. 89-0904670 
Barnard v. Sutliff 
Affidavit of Mark Gustavson 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
*0 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH_ 
V^J^&n. NotarvPubfle _ , 
I , * l l l 3 ^ VIRGINIA PeVEPEUJS I \uW@£sk<\ 43t8 South 4665 West I IMflEKftVA West \totey. Utah Wt20 I My Commas!** Expiree I 
* March 23.1993 I SUteofUtai) I
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the^j^fcday of FEBRUARY, 1990, I caused to 
be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing pleading AFFIDIAVIT OF MARK S. 
GUSTAVSON, ESQ, to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepa 
Service. 
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DEPUTY Cf)«JB-irn?s-~ 
id in the United StatVPosta 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC . 
Attorney l o ^ H ^ R T i f f 
FILED QKTftiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 i test) 
SALT LAX* COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Cler* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890904670 
Before the Court is the defendants' Motion for Sanctions 
and Fees. The matter is submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. Both the defendant as 
moving party and the plaintiff have submitted Memoranda of 
Points and Authorities, as well as Affidavits supporting their 
respective positions. There has been no request for oral 
argument, and the Court does not deem that oral argument is 
necessary. The Court has carefully reviewed the entire file in 
this matter, including the pleadings and the moving and 
resisting papers with regard to this Motion, Being therefore 
fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The defendants in this case seek sanctions against the 
plaintiff for the filing of this Complaint on the basis that 
the conduct of the plaintiff violated Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and further that the filing of the 
Complaint constitutes a violation of Section 78-27-56, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, As sanctions, the defendants seek 
their attorney's fees incurred in defending this matter. 
Dealing first with the defendants' claim that the 
plaintiff's Complaint violates Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953 as amended, in that the Complaint was brought in bad 
faith and without merit, the Court is satisfied based on the 
standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in dealing with 
requests for attorney's fees under the aforementioned statute, 
that the requisite showing has not been made by the 
defendants. This Court cannot say on the present state of the 
pleadings, that the Complaint was brought in bad faith. Nor 
can this Court say, based upon the present state of the 
pleadings, that the Complaint was wholly without merit when it 
was originally filed. 
The Court notes that there appears to be a substantial 
question of fact between the defendants and the plaintiff 
regarding what was said in the conversation on August 2, 1989 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
between the defendant Toni M. Sutliff and the plaintiff Brian 
M. Barnard. Mr. Barnard suggests that he was advised by Ms. 
Sutliff that he would not receive at any time# even after the 
screening panel was designated, the names of the panel. The 
defendants suggest that had Mr. Barnard waited more than a few 
hours to file his Complaint after the aforementioned 
conversation with Ms. Sutliff, that he would have been provided 
the information requested. Because of that question of fact, 
this Court cannot say that there was no basis for Mr. Barnard 
to seek the relief that he originally sought in his Complaint 
filed August 2, 1989. 
Accordingly, after careful consideration, this Court is 
unwilling to impose sanctions in the form of attorney's fees or 
otherwise, as requested by the defendants, on the basis that 
the plaintiff has violated Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended. 
Turning to the claimed violations asserted by the 
defendants against the plaintiffs under Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does not believe that there 
has been a showing of lack of reasonable inquiry into the facts 
by the plaintiff before this suit was filed, and on that basis 
the Court is unwilling to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the form 
of attorney's fees or otherwise. Also, the defendants allege 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that the Verified Complaint was interposed for an improper 
purpose, such as harassment, and in that regard has submitted 
an Affidavit of Mr. Hutchinson, Executive Director of the Utah 
State Bar, setting forth substantial pieces of correspondence 
between Mr. Barnard, the plaintiff herein, and the Utah State 
Bar, a defendant herein, as well as a summary of litigation 
between Mr. Barnard and the Utah State Bar. While it is clear 
that Mr. Barnard may constitute an annoyance to the defendant 
Bar, the Court is unable to say, particularly because of the 
dispute in the factual situation as to whether or not Mr. 
Barnard would ever be provided with the names of the screening 
panel that had been assigned to hear the disciplinary complaint 
filed against him, that the Complaint was interposed for 
improper purposes, such as harassment. 
Finally, the defendants suggest that there was a lack of 
any reasonable inquiry into the law, as required by Rule 11, in 
that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the District 
Court lacked any jurisdiction with regard to matters pertaining 
to the discipline of attorneys, but rather original and 
exclusive jurisdiction for such matters rests with the Utah 
Supreme Court. At the very least, the plaintiff recognized the 
defect when he voluntarily dismissed this matter after filing a 
writ seeking the same relief before the Utah Supreme Court. 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff argues by way of defense of the improper filing 
that he has filed other matters in the District Court relating 
to Bar issues, involving the discipline of attorneys, and that 
those matters continue to pend. If, in fact, the two earlier 
cases that the plaintiff refers to do involve matters which 
should properly be before the Supreme Court and not the 
District Court, it is no defense to suggest that the 
jurisdiction of the District Court has been improperly invoked 
on prior occasions as a justification for an improper filing a 
third time, to wit: in this case. In addition, it is no 
defense on the part of the plaintiff to suggest that the 
defendants herein would be required to respond before the 
Supreme Court in any event. The complaint by the defendants 
is that had a reasonable inquiry into the law been made by the 
plaintiff, it would have been adamantly clear that the District 
Court was an improper location for filing the claims asserted 
in this suit, and that they had to respond in the District 
Court where they would not have otherwise been required to do 
so. 
This Court is satisfied that had Mr. Barnard made a 
reasonable inquiry into the status of the law pertaining to 
issues of jurisdiction regarding the nature of the controversy 
reflected in the present suit, that it would have been clear 
BARNARD V, SUTLIFF PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that the District Court was not an appropriate forum within 
which to seek relief. On that basis, this Court determines 
that the plaintiff has failed to make a proper inquiry, and has 
therefore violated Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 11 mandates sanctions, and the only sanction 
that would have any legitimate effect on the plaintiff to 
insure a reasonable inquiry as to the status of the law on the 
part of the plaintiff in the future, and to restore the 
defendants financially because of the requirement to respond to 
this case improperly filed in the District Court, is an award 
of attorney's fees. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines that the 
defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees in 
responding to the plaintiff's Complaint filed herein. The fact 
that the defendants have not acted in a presumptuous fashion by 
filing an Affidavit regarding the amount of fees until this 
Court determined that they are entitled to fees, as it has now 
done, does not constitute a defect. The entitlement to 
attorney's fees is determined in this Memorandum Decision. 
The amount of attorney's fees shall be determined upon the 
filing of an appropriate Affidavit on the part of the 
defendants, setting forth the attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to the plaintiff's improvidently filed lawsuit. In 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that regard, the Court would require that such an Affidavit be 
filed within ten (10) days from the date of this Memorandum 
Decision. Upon the filing of the Affidavit, the plaintiff 
shall have ten (10) days within which to file any Objection to 
the amount of attorney's fees requested, setting forth in 
detail any objections, if any, including the reasons why the 
fee should not be allowed. Upon receipt of the Affidavit and 
any Objections that might be filed, the Court will consider the 
amount of attorney's fees, and if necessary, the Court will 
request oral argument to be scheduled, as may be appropriate. 
The Court would not require an Order regarding entitlement 
to attorney's fees at this point in time, but rather will 
require the defendants to prepare an appropriate Order setting 
forth the issues of entitlement as determined in this 
Memorandum Decision, and the amount of attorney's fees that 
might be determined following the filing of an appropriate 
Affidavit. 
Dated this 63 day of February, 1990. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this /? day of February, 1990: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Pro se 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert H. Rees 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND. FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890904670 
Before the Court is a determination as to the amount of 
attorney's fees due the defendants as a result of imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff, all as set forth by 
this Court in its Memorandum Decision of February 12, 1990. 
Also before the Court is the defendants' Motion to Strike 
portions of the plaintiff's Objection to an award of attorney's 
fees, and the Affidavits of various attorneys filed by the 
plaintiff in connection with his objection to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
The plaintiff has submitted a Notice to Submit for Decision 
as to his Objection relating to an award of attorney's fees. 
While there is no formal Notice to Submit for Decision, 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the defendants' Motion to Strike, it is an integral part of the 
Objection to the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, and 
inasmuch as all parties have had an opportunity to address that 
issue in Memoranda, it is Likewise ripe for decision. 
Finally, the plaintiff has requested oral argument relating 
to his Objection. The plaintiff in his Request for Oral 
Argument does not suggest any basis upon which this Court 
should grant the Request for Oral Argument. Inasmuch as the 
determination of the amount of attorney's fees is not a motion 
considered "dispositive," there does not appear to be any 
requirement for oral argument. The Court does not believe that 
oral argument, particularly in view of the pleadings that have 
been submitted, would be of any benefit to the Court in making 
a determination as to the amount of attorney's fees. 
Accordingly, the Court denies the plaintiff's request for oral 
argument, and will decide this matter based upon the pleadings 
tnat have been filed. 
Turning first to the defendants' Motion to Strike. The 
defendants suggest that a substantial portion of the 
plaintiff's Objection and the plaintiff's Second Affidavit are 
subject to a Motion to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as being immaterial. The 
defendants further suggest that the eight Affidavits filed by 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the plaintiff in connection with his Objection to the award of 
attorney's fees are also immaterial. The defendants base their 
assertion of immateriality on the claim that the plaintiff is 
merely attempting to introduce additional materials relating to 
the question of entitlement of attorney's fees, an issue which 
was resolved by this Court in its Memorandum Decision of 
February 12, 1990. 
Plaintiff responds, claiming that it is his position that 
the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded is zero, 
based upon his assertion that the Court erred in finding that 
Rule 11 sanctions should apply in this case. Plaintiff's 
position is misplaced. The Court clearly ruled on the issue of 
entitlement, and does not intend to revisit that issue under 
the guise suggested by the plaintiff that the amount of 
attorney's fees should be zero, because the defendants are not 
entitled to attorney's fees. The Court's Memorandum Decision 
determining that attorney's fees were appropriate and 
establishing entitlement thereto only allows the plaintiff to 
object to the amount of attorney's fees, and then with 
particularity, regarding amount. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Affidavits submitted by 
attorneys John B. Maycock, Gary B. Ferguson, Mark S. Gustavson, 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Ross C. Anderson, Robert Breeze, James Ausenbaugh, G. Steven 
Sullivan, and Kevin N. Anderson are stricken as immaterial. In 
addition, paragraphs 2 through 13, including the various 
subparts of the plaintiff's Second Affidavit, dated February 
26, 1990, are likewise stricken as immaterial. 
Finally, the plaintiff's document styled "Objection," dated 
February 26, 1990 is stricken, with the exception of the 
paragraph on page 6 addressing the amount of attorney's fees, 
and the last sentence on page 7 of the Objection under the 
heading "Conclusion," wherein the plaintiff opines, "the 
attorney's fees requested are excessive." Having stricken all 
or part of the pleadings and other materials submitted by the 
plaintiff in aid of his Objection to the amount of attorney's 
fees, the Court declines to consider that information in 
connection with a determination as to the amount of attorney's 
fees to be awarded to the defendants. The Court specifically 
rejects the plaintiff's position that he is entitled to revisit 
the issue of entitlement on the theory that no attorney's fees 
should be awarded. 
Turning to the principal issue before the Court, to wit: 
the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to the defendants 
based upon this Court's prior finding that Rule 11 sanctions 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
were appropriate, the Court has before it the Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees submitted by Robert H. Rees, counsel for the 
defendants. Accompanying that Affidavit and included therein 
is a computerized billing, showing services rendered, the date 
thereof, the attorney rendering the service, the time involved 
in rendering the service, and the dollar amount for the 
particular service. 
A review of that itemized bill shows the Court that it is 
the customary itemized billing used by attorneys practicing in 
this community, billing on an hourly basis. The total amount 
of attorney's fees billed to the defendants is $4,381.00. The 
billing includes a statement for costs advanced, however, this 
Court does not consider the issue of costs advanced by 
defendants' counsel on behalf of the defendants, inasmuch as 
the Memorandum Decision dealing with the entitlement of 
attorney's fees limited itself to attorney's fees, and did not 
make a determination that costs would be awarded. 
In response to the amount of attorney's fees requested by 
the defendants, the plaintiff has provided the Court with what 
can best be described as a conclusory opinion, claiming that 
the attorney's fees are excessive, and suggesting that the 
amount requested could not reasonably be necessary for the 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
activities accomplished by defendants' counsel on behalf of 
their clients in responding to the plaintiff's Complaint. The 
plaintiff further suggests that this Court should not allow any 
attorney's fees for time incurred or services rendered as to 
the Motion for Sanctions itself, but should limit an award of 
attorney's fees, if any at all, to the defendants' pleadings in 
response to the original Complaint. 
As to plaintiff's second argument, it must be rejected. 
The legal fees incurred in pursuing a legitimate Motion for 
Sanctions under Rule 11, or otherwise, surely must be 
recoverable, otherwise it could very well be economically 
impossible for an aggrieved party to seek redress under Rule 
11. Abuses under Rule 11 should be brought to the Court's 
attention when they occur, and not ignored merely because the 
costs of doing so might outweigh the potential recovery in the 
form of attorney's fees gained. To hold otherwise would 
effectively nullify the policy reasons that suggested the 
necessity of Rule 11 sanctions in the first instance. 
In determining the amount of fees, the defendants' 
Affidavit and itemized billing provides the Court with 
substantially more guidance as to the proper amount of 
attorney's fees than does the plaintiff's conclusory statements 
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that the fees are excessive. The plaintiff has neglected to 
suggest to this Court any particular entries that he believes 
are excessive; he has failed to suggest what a reasonable 
amount of attorney's fees might be for a particular service; 
nor has he suggested that the hourly rate charged is excessive, 
to the contrary, the evidence that this Court hears frequently 
from various lawyers practicing law in this community regarding 
a range of reasonable hourly rate suggests that the hourly 
rates claimed by the defendants falls into the range of 
reasonableness. 
In reviewing the itemized statement of defendants' counsel 
relating to legal services provided to the defendants in this 
matter, the Court notes that there are entries for particular 
days where more than one attorney has provided service in 
connection with this case. A review of the materials submitted 
does not suggest that the work was merely duplication, but 
rather in view of defendants' counsel's Affidavit that the fees 
set forth on the statement were all reasonably and necessarily 
incurred in representing the defendants in response to the 
plaintiff's Complaint and in preparing defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions. Nothing to the contrary has been offered by the 
plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court declines to assume that the 
work was duplication. 
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Therefore, considering the materials submitted by the 
defendant, and the materials submitted by the plaintiff that 
relate to the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, the 
evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the defendants' 
claim for attorney's fees. While this Court may have some 
leeway to adjust attorney's fees awarded, it can not ignore 
proper evidence where nothing is offered in response. The 
Court determines that an appropriate amount of attorney's fees 
is the amount requested by the defendants, and awards 
attorney's fees in the sum of $4,381.00. 
Turning to the defendants' claim that this Court should use 
its equitable powers to correct the plaintiff's perceived error 
in the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, the Court declines to 
exercise such powers, even if the Rules of Procedure suggested 
that such an approach would be proper under what the plaintiff 
has filed as an Objection, inasmuch as this Court is not of the 
opinion that the prior Memorandum Decision was in error, or 
that it contains any substantive mistakes. The plaintiff's 
attempt to relitigate issues of entitlement of attorney's fees 
is improper. The submission of affidavits, whether the 
plaintiff's or non-party attorney's, are out of time as 
indicated above in the Court's decision striking them as 
immaterial. The issue of entitlement was decided on February 
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12, 1990, and an attempt to place additional evidence in front 
of the Court by the plaintiff, now the losing party, is no more 
proper in this circumstance than it would be if a party 
attempted to introduce evidence on appeal for the first time. 
As a final observation regarding the issue of jurisdiction 
which led to issuance of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this Court was and is hard pressed to accept 
plaintiff's argument for jurisdiction of this type of matter in 
the district courts when the plaintiff in filing his verified 
petition for extraordinary writ (Supreme Court Number 890445) 
asserted that the Supreme Curt has "exclusive jurisdiction" of 
attorney discipline matters and "the action could not be filed 
in District Court," Plaintiff's position regarding 
jurisdiction appears to vary between the Supreme Court and this 
filing in the District Court. 
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an Order 
encompassing the ruling of this Court in its original 
Memorandum Decision of February 12, 1990 dealing with the 
imposition of sanctions, and the question of entitlement to 
attorney's fees, and further to include in the proposed Order 
this Court's determination as to the amount of attorney's 
fees. In addition to the Order dealing with the entitlement 
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and amount of attorney's fees, the defendants' counsel shall 
also prepare an appropriate Judgment in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff for the amount of attorney's fees 
awarded in the Order. The aforementioned Order and Judgment 
should be submitted in accordance with the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this /y day of March, 1990. 
VlliOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and UTAH 
STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AND FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEE 
Civil No. 890904670 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
On or about January 10, 1990, defendants filed a 
motion for sanctions and for an attorney's fee pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. Defendants are 
represented by Carman E. Kipp and Robert H. Rees of the firm 
of Kipp and Christian, P.C, and plaintiff Brian M. Barnard 
represents himself. The court considered defendants' 
motion, the affidavit of Steven F. Hutchinson, and 
defendants' memorandum and reply memorandum in support of 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
H 
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their motion for sanctions and for attorney's fee. The 
court also considered the affidavit of plaintiff and 
plaintiff's response to the motion for sanctions and then 
ruled by memorandum decision dated February 12, 1990 that 
defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees 
pursuant to their motion based on Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The court then considered the affidavit of Robert 
H. Rees and plaintiff's objection, the second affidavit of 
plaintiff, plaintiff's request for judicial notice, and 
eight affidavits filed by plaintiff, together with his 
request for oral argument. On or about March 5, 1990, 
defendants filed a motion to strike the eight affidavits 
filed by plaintiff and portions of the second affidavit of 
plaintiff and plaintiff's objection. The court considered 
defendants' motion to strike and their memorandum in support 
of that motion and plaintiff's response to the motion to 
strike together with plaintiff's second request for judicial 
notice. The court then entered its memorandum decision 
dated March 14, 1990. j 
Based upon this court's memorandum decisions dated 
February 12, 1990 and March 14, 1990, having considered all 
of the materials indicated above submitted by the parties, 
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and being fully advised, the court now hereby orders as 
follows: 
1. Plaintifffs request for oral argument relating 
to his objection is denied. 
2. Defendants" motion to strike is granted and 
the affidavits submitted by John B. Maycock, Gary B. 
Ferguson, Mark S. Gustavson, Ross C. Anderson, Robert 
Breeze, James Ausenbaugh, G. Steven Sullivan, and Kevin N. 
Anderson and paragraphs 2-13 of plaintiff's second affidavit 
and all of plaintiff's objection dated February 26, 1990 
except the paragraph on page 6 addressing the amount of 
attorney's fees and the last sentence on page 7 under the 
heading "Conclusion" where the plaintiff states that "the 
attorney's fees requested are excessive" are stricken. 
3. Defendants1 motion for sanctions pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and 
defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the sum of 
$4,381.00. Judgment should be entered against plaintiff in 
favor of defendants in that amount. 
DATED this c><jLjday of Ma*efr, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
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1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Regarding Defendants1 Motion for Sanctions and for 
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Attorney's Fee was HAND DELIVERED to the following: 
Brian M, Barnard 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
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Third Judicial District 
CARMAN E. KIPP - #1829 
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175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and UTAH 
STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 890904670 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Based upon this court's order awarding defendants 
their attorney's fees in the sum of $4,381.00, the court 
hereby enters judgment in favor of defendants against 
plaintiff in the sum of $4,381.00. 
DATED this <=»<^aay of MaJch-, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / Z^day of March, 
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was 
HAND DELIVERED to the following: 
Brian M. Barnard 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
: Civil No. 89-0904670 
: ORDER DENYING MOTIONS 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
on the plaintiff's Request for Oral Arguments, the plain-
tiff's Motion to Enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and the plain-
tiffs Motion to Stay Proceedings, the parties having 
submitted written memorandums, the matter having been 
submitted under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, and the 
Court having fully considered the arguments and representa-
tions of counsel, based thereon and for good cause appear-
ing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The plaintiff's request for oral argument is denied; 
The plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings is denied; 
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The plaintiff's motion to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is denied; and, 
The plaintiff's motion for a new trial is denied. 
DATED this day of APRIL, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of APRIL, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
pleading ORDER DENYING MOTIONS to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 4th South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
by< SJMlUnUi ^ / / / M , 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111 - 3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TONI M. SUTLIFF and 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Defendants. 
: Civil No. 89-0904670 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
(Hon. T.R. HANSON) 
THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD hereby gives notice of 
his appeal of that certain Order (April 23, 1990) and 
Judgment (April 23, 1990) entered in the above captioned 
matter granting attorney fees and sanctions under Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure against the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff further appeals the Court's denial (May 2f 
1990) of his motion for a new trial on said issue. 
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 1990. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of MAY, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
pleading NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
ROBERT REES 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 East 4th South // 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Art. VIH f 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court] 
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United 
States. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of supreme court — Judges 
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.] 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in 
the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the 
supreme court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the supreme 
court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore 
to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The 
supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to 
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the supreme 
court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(it) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer jto the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over "which* the* Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (0. 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78-3-4, Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — 
Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed 
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of 
the district court in multiple judge districts, or the district court judge in 
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When 
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings 
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced 
in the circuit court and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court 
of Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district 
court are under Sections 78*2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative pro* 
ceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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